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There have been three times more attacks to naval ships using sea mines than all other 
forms combined. Sea mines have always been viewed upon as underhanded and 
unchivalrous, yet they provide a weaker navy the capability to stall and damage a vastly 
superior navy. Utilizing unmanned sensors to detect sea mines is the goal of the navy for 
the future. 
Computer-aided detection (CAD) of sea mines is much faster and more consistent 
than a human operator, yet it is not currently being utilized by any of our mine 
countermeasure assets. Although there are many studies that have incorporated computer 
aided detection and classification algorithms with sonar imagery for mine warfare, few 
have used Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR). During an amphibious assault scenario 
the ability to land assets quickly and mitigate risk is vital to the success. This thesis 
analyzes Rapid Overt Aerial Reconnaissance data from an Office of Naval Research 
experiment by Fort Walton Beach, FL. The CAD algorithm that was developed 
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Naval mine warfare has the ability to enhance a commander’s ability to increase 
combat power while sustaining the current force, conduct operations both offensive or 
defensive, gain the element of surprise, and gain or restrict key or sea routes. Mine 
warfare (MIW) is the strategic and tactical employment and countering of sea mines 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff 1999). Since the Korean War, there have been three times the 
number of attacks to U.S. Naval ships from mines than all other types of attacks 
combined as seen in Figure 1 (Avery 1998). A naval mine is one of the most cost-
effective weapons and is a force multiplier that can sway the tide of a battle (Ocean 
Studies Board 2000). On 14 April 1987, an Iranian contact mine crippled the guided-
missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts FFG-58 and incurred $96 million dollars’ worth of 
damage from a $1,500 mine that was based off of a 1908 Russian design. A single mine 
can cause a delay of days or weeks of critical assets and also disrupt sea lines of 
communication at the same time. Mines can be deployed using aircraft, ships, or 
submarines, or just by threatening to lay mines. In fact it does not take any mines to 
create a minefield, if intelligence indicates that there is a high probability that mines have 
been laid. In January 1980 the “patriotic scuba diver” claimed by telephone to have 
mined the Sacramento River during the Soviet grain embargo; at which point all shipping 
movement ceased (Truver 2008). It took the Navy minesweeper USS Gallant MSO-489 
four days of mine hunting to determine the channel was safe and no mines were ever 
found. The cost to the port caused by the hoax was estimated in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. 
A. HISTORY OF MIW 
Usually sea mines are utilized by smaller or weaker countries or states that do not 
have a strong navy. The definition of mine warfare is “the strategic and tactical use of sea 
mines and their countermeasures, including all offensive and defensive mining and 
protection against mines” (Melian 1991). In our country, sea mines have been a used 
since the revolutionary war when on 6 September 1776, Bushnell’s, American Turtle 
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attempted to attack the British Flag ship HMS Eagle. The attempt failed but began led to 
future attacks on British ships using torpedoes, which we now call sea mines. In the civil 
war sea mines were the “South’s strategic sea-denial weapon of choice (PEO LMW 
2009). During WWI and WWII the use of influence mines became much more prevalent 
allowing mines to discriminate which ships they target. Post WWII mines have gotten 
more sophisticated and many older mines have been modified with newer actuation 
technology making older mines much more useful.  The problem that most countries have 
with MIW is that it cared about and during war time and when an incident happens yet 
during peace times it may not even be on the back burner.  
 
 Attacks on U.S. Navy vessels since the Korean War (from Avery, 1998) Figure 1. 
B. MIW BACKGROUND 
In MIW, two of the key concerns that a planner has to consider are the type of 
mines that may be deployed and the environment that the mines are located. 
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1. Types of Mines 
Sea mines are categorized in three distinct ways. First, they are categorized by the 
way in which they are deployed, whether by air, sea or by submarine. Each of the 
methods of deployment has its strengths and also its limitations. The second category is 
where the mines are situated in the water column. Whether they are on the drifting (not 
moored), moored and the mine is somewhere between the bottom and the surface, and 
bottom mines. The third category is how the mine is actuated. This can be done remotely, 
by direct contact with the mine or by a wide variety of electronic actuating devices. A 
good miner will use each method of deployment to control the battle space. 
2. MCM Triad 
The MCM Triad encompasses the following areas, air (AMCM), surface 
(SMCM), and underwater (UMCM). AMCM assets are able to hunt, sweep and 
neutralize sea mines in a timely manner but operations are limited to day light hours. 
SMCM assets have the ability to operate around the click but must stop and prosecute 
each and every mine like contact (MILCO). UMCM assets are currently the slowest by 
far but have the ability to hunt virtually undetected and can operate confined waters. Each 
type of MCM operations has their own strengths and area of expertise and incorporating 
all areas is a must in order to clear a mine field in a timely manner.  
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 
To understand how to perform MCM operation a person must understand the 
environment in which the operations are going to be taking place. The environmental 
factors of ocean currents, tides, bathymetry, water clarity and doctrinal bottom type 
(DBT) must be incorporated into the mission plan. When ocean currents are intense the 
ability to detect and neutralize mines can be impaired. Knowing the tidal variation can 
impact the ability and what assets can detect obstacles and mines in surf zones prior to an 





where there may be routes that are un-minable. The water clarity will impact the ability to 
neutralize submerged contacts when the optical backscatter is large and diver visibility is 
less than a few feet. The Mine Warfare Commander (MCMC) must be able to understand 
how the clutter, roughness, burial of the sea floor factor into doctrinal bottom type (DBT) 
and how it affects the ability of sensors to locate a mine. When the MCMC knows the 
environment in which they are operating the ability to detect, classify, identify, neutralize 
or avoid sea mines increases exponentially. 
D. INCORPORATING COMPUTER AIDED DETECTION / COMPUTER 
AIDED CLASSIFICATION (CAD/CAC) INTO COASTAL BATTLEFIELD 
RECONNAISSANCE AND ANALYSIS (COBRA) 
1. COBRA 
The COBRA program began in the 1990s as a Marine Corp as an advanced 
technology demonstration (PEO LCS 2011). The program was later transferred to the 
Navy in 2004 for its detection ability for the Assault Breaching Systems (ABS). By 2009, 
funding was awarded to procure the low rate initial production units.  “The mission of 
COBRA is to conduct unmanned, aerial, tactical reconnaissance in the littoral barrel 
space, for the purpose of detecting and localizing mine fields & obstacles in the surf zone 
and beach zone, prior to an amphibious assault.”  The COBRA module will be housed in 
the MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(VTUAV) (Figure 2). This VTUAV is part of the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) MCM 
mission module and allows operators to be at a safe operating distance while surveying a 
hostile Surf Zone (SZ) and Craft Landing Zone (CLZ). 
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 VTUAV with the COBRA sensor Figure 2. 
The COBRA program is being developed in three blocks with each increment 
adding onto the increment before. The first block provides detection of surface mines and 
obstacles in the Beach Zone (BZ) or CLZ during the day (Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC)/ 2011). In the first block the data has to be downloaded from the VTUAV before 
the data can be processed. The second block provides night time operating capability and 
the ability to detect obstacles and mines in the SZ (IOC/2015). The major upgrade in the 
block two system is the utilization of Rapid, Overt, Airborne, Reconnaissance (ROAR) 
package that uses a multi-spectral 3-D Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) system. 
The third block will add the capability to detect buried mines and allow for near real time 
processing (IOC/2018) (Almquist 2009). The problem lies in that all of the increments 
rely on a human operator to look at the data to determine if there is a MILCO or obstacle 
present which is very time consuming. 
2. CAD/CAC 
The concept of CAD/CAC being incorporated into MIW is not a new concept and 
dates back into the mid-1990s (Dobeck et al. 1997). The problem though is that the vast 
majority of CAD/CAC algorithms deal with sonar imagery, whether they are forward 
looking sonars or side scan sonars. Sonar imagery has come a long way in the past 
decade and the resolution is very high. This allows for very in depth and sophisticated 
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algorithms to be used to find various mine sea mines in varying depths in the water 
column. The SZ and CLZ is an area that is not able to be surveyed with traditional sonar 
systems. First the SZ is very turbulent due to wave action which does not allow for sonar 
systems to be stable enough to acquire usable imagery. The ROAR systems package was 
developed to operate from the air using a LIDAR system that not only took 2-D imagery 
but 3-D imagery as well. Since a CAD/CAC algorithm is not currently planned for this 
type sensor, the goal of this thesis is to develop a CAD/CAC algorithm to find MILCO 





A. REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
The beginnings of MIW in America are attributed to one man, by the name of 
David Bushnell. He not only created our first limpet style mine, our first mine lines, but 
also our first “sub-marine,” the American Turtle. His three attempts during the 
revolutionary war did not damage any British ships, but did show the ability of sea mines 
to challenge a stronger and larger navy. In 1776, David Bushnell and his brother built the 
American turtle, so named because it looked like two turtle shells joined together (Figure 
3). On the evening of September 6, 1776 Sergeant Ezra Lee positioned the Turtle under 
the HMS Eagle, the flagship of Lord Howe, and attempted to drill a hole and attach its 
200 pound explosive. The screw was not able to penetrate the hull because he hit an iron 
bracing near the keel, and Ezra was forced to retreat as day was breaking. As he retreated, 
a guard boat gave chase; he released and detonated the explosive/torpedo in his wake 
allowing him to get away. During the rest of the Revolutionary War, little is known of the 
exploits of the Turtle, but this was just the beginning for Bushnell. 
 
 Drawing of the American Turtle, based on Bushnell’s own  Figure 3. 
written description (from Batchelor, 2002) 
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In August 1777, Bushnell, saw the Cerberus anchored off the coast of Connecticut 
and devised a way of deploying one of the world’s earliest sea mines (Abbass 2008). He 
planned to attack the Cerberus by sending two floating barrels, filled with explosive, and 
connect by a line. The idea was to use the prevailing current as propulsion and the 
Cerberus would run into the line causing the two mines to contact the hull and detonate 
the barrels. On the morning of August 14, 1777, Bushnell launched the two sea mines, 
but a schooner that was tied behind Cerberus saw what looked like a fishing line. As the 
four man crew pulled in the line they found one of the barrels, which they hauled 
onboard. The sea mine detonated, destroying the schooner, killing three men and 
wounding a fourth. The Cerberus was unharmed from the explosion. 
Bushnell’s last attempt to use sea mines in the Revolutionary war took place on 
the Delaware River on January 7, 1778 (Melia 1991). The approach was going to be 
similar to the August 1777 mission but without the line connecting any of the sea mines 
together. The floating gunpowder filled kegs, armed with a simple flint lock actuator 
were launched down the Delaware River very early in the morning. The problem was that 
the current was not as fast as anticipated and the kegs did not arrive to the harbor until 
after sunrise. A couple of British sailors saw and attempted to retrieve one of the kegs, 
which exploded killing four British sailors. The British forces then began to fire at any 
and all debris that was floating in the water; causing this battle to be referred to by 
historians as the “battle of Kegs.” 
B. CIVIL WAR 
There were a few notable advances in MIW prior to the civil was including 
Samuel Colts electrically controlled mine detonation system and Robert Fulton’s moored 
contact sea mine; both of which were not appreciated or accepted until the civil war 
began (Melia 1991). When the civil war began in 1861 the union had a strong navy and 
the confederate navy was still in its infancy. The south realized like so many countries 
today that sea mines could quickly and with much less cost help balance the power at sea. 
The Unions Admiral Farragut view point on MIW was, “I have always deemed it 
unworthy of a chivalrous nation, but it does not do to give your enemy such a decided 
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superiority over you.”  The union viewed the mines as more tedious than a treat at the 
beginning of the war. Each ship’s Captain had to create his own ingenuity to create MCM 
devices for his ship and most had none.   
The south on the other hand viewed mines as the answer to their weak navy and 
actively funded MIW to offset there weak navy. The confederacy then set up the 
Confederate Submarine Battery service which utilized controlled or remote detonated sea 
mines; followed by funding the Torpedo Bureau in October 1942. A design that is still 
used today was developed by the Confederate inventor Gabriel J. Rains. Rains created a 
contact mine, using tarred wood barrels, some with wood cones attached to the both ends 
(Figure 4).  “When the glass and chemical fuse contacted a ship, the chemicals broke into 
a chamber filled with alcohol and liquid gunpowder and exploded the tightly packed 
charge of powder housed in the sides of the barrel” (Melia 1991).  In other words, he 
created the first chemical horn actuator which is still used on many contact mines today. 
By the end of the civil war, the Union realized that the torpedoes were of a threat rather 
than a nuisance and many Captains would not enter waterways that were potentially 
mined unless directly ordered to. After the civil war ended the lessons learned, funding 
for MIW and the officers with MIW experience, disappeared. The knowledge of MIW 
went back to the way it was before the war which was, “dependent upon the interest of 
individual naval officers” (Melia 1991). 
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 Rains Keg Torpedo—The deadliest sea mine in the confederate inventory  Figure 4. 
(from the Harper’s Weekly 1865)  
C. WWI AND WWII 
At the onset of World War I, sea mines where still contact and remotely actuated 
but were not only used in shallow waters. The use of sea mines was used very 
successfully to control sea lines of communication and restrict movement. During WWI 
there were at least three major advances/inventions in MIW; the British developed the 
magnetic influence mine and the paravane sweep system, while Germany invented the 
delayed rising moored contact mine (Melia 1991). Mine warfare was used extensively 
throughout WWI, but the only new technology that was a game changer was the paravane 
sweep system. 
The British invented a magnetic actuator for a sea mine that allowed a sea mine to 
reside on the bottom (Melia 1991). So in essence the invention of the magnetic actuator 
also led to the invention of the first bottom mine. The magnetic actuator works on the 
principle that every large metal ship while being constructed obtains its own small 
magnetic field. So when a ship passes over the actuator, it senses the magnetic field and 
actuates the sea mine. The British viewed these mines as unsweepable so they created 
them to become inert after a certain period of time and did not use them very often. This 
type of actuator has been improved upon but is still in use today. 
 11 
When the Germans invented the delayed rising mine they stumbled onto one of 
the first counter mine counter measure (CMCM) inventions and one that is still 
incorporated into some mines today. The reason that it was invented was so that a mine 
field that was swept by enemy forces and viewed upon as free of mines was in all 
actuality still active. Mine sweepers would come through with their tow cables and hooks 
and would possible find a couple mines but after making a final and not detecting any 
mines the area would be viewed upon a cleared (Melia 1991). Then the delaying 
mechanism would actuate and another mine or more would enter into the area where it 
perceived as clear. Today this technology is used with various influence actuators ranging 
from a time delay or a ship count before rising into the water column and in harm’s way.  
The most used invention during WWI and immediately after the war was the 
Paravane system (Figure 5) (Melia 1991). The paravanes would be deployed in pairs, one 
on each side of a ship, as the ship moved through the water the paravanes would move 
away from the ship, the paravanes were connected to the ship by sharp wires that would 
cut mine mooring as they passed. This caused the moored contact mines to surface 
whereby they could be neutralized. The paravanes where not used by just warships but 
also commercial ships so that by the 1918, 2,700 ships worldwide utilized the Paravane 
(Melia 1991).   
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 Paravane used by both the British and American navies during WWI  Figure 5. 
(from Malia, 1991) 
After the end of WWI the United States stopped working on MCM research and 
little was accomplished until WWII. Within weeks of returning to America, the MCM 
reserve units disbanded, minesweepers were moth balled, and officers with MCM 
experience were scattered throughout the fleets. The British on the other hand took the 
lessons learned and established “an active mine warfare school, developing active and 
reserve minesweeping fleets, and enhancing the promotion potential of MCM officers” 
(Melia 1991). This disparity in reaction may have been due to the relatively small number 
of enemy mines that affected our own home waters. Also after WWI most American 
officers avoided MIW assignments, “believing quite accurately that it was a road block to 
promotion” (Melia 1991). The naval exercises that incorporated in a MIW scenarios often 
had mining and MCM plans that were inconsistent with the actual warfare conditions and 
often based on practices that were used prior to WWI. During peacetime, only two 
scientists were responsible for all U.S. Navy ordnance, as a result, MCM suffered and 
progress remained stagnant (Melia 1991). 
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The start of WWII brought in a game changer, the introduction of the influence 
mine. Even though British developed the magnetic actuated sea mine during WWI it was 
rarely used. At the beginning of WWII Germany began using not only the Magnetic 
influence mine but the acoustic actuated influence mine and a mine that contained both. 
The influence mine was predominately a bottom mine that was not able to be swept using 
the sweep methods of WWI. Since the United States had not conducted much research 
into MIW since WWI, the United States was woefully behind at the onset of WWII. 
Germany began utilizing these new mines at the very beginning of WWII when it mined 
the coast of Great Britain. In September the first British ship sank in an area that was 
believed to be cleared after sweeping. Shipping losses continued to increase, leading 
Britain to add magnets to their sweep cables, after correctly suspecting the Germans of 
reseeding mine fields by air with magnetic influence mines. It was not until a fully 
functional German magnetic influence mine was unintentionally dropped on a beach that 
strategies to counter this new mine were discovered (Melia 1991). 
In the winter of 1942, German U-boats deployed over three hundred influence 
mines off Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay, Jacksonville, Florida, and Charleston, South 
Carolina; thereby closing ports for days and forcing the United States to conduct MCM 
operations in its home waters (Melia 1991). Then in June German submarines reseeded 
the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay and Hampton Roads, Virginia; sinking two ships, 
damaging one, and shutting down naval traffic into and out of Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
for four days. The Navy converted more than 125 fishing ships to mine sweepers in an 
attempt to sweep the coasts, but still some ports were closed for over a month. 
By the end of WWII, the influence mines were becoming more and more 
advanced. Germany designed a pressure influence mine that was not able to be safely 
countered without high risk to the mine sweepers (Melia 1991). Many of the mines had 
combination sensors which had to be actuated more than one sensor. Also some of the 
mines had ship counters which caused for more a mine to be countered repeatedly before 
detonating which increased time and cost to clear a mined area. Once again, at the 
conclusion of the war, interest in MIW was lost due to few experienced personnel 
remained, lack of interest and lessons went unlearned. 
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D. POST WWII 
Mines and MCM efforts since the World Wars have increased tremendously. As 
of today we have the ability to hunt for mines and often times by using a sensor that 
keeps the sailor out of the minefield altogether. The use of advanced forward looking 
sonar systems on MCM ships allows for detecting the mine before the mine can harm the 
ship. The use of AMCM assets to sweep and hunt over a mine field so that a ships are not 
in danger, is possible. The use of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to hunt in areas 
without being detected is another huge advance. Yet with all of these advances the United 
states has had four times more attacks on ships from mines than all other forms combined 
(missile, torpedo, airplane and small boat). With all of our advances the sea mine is still 
the most damaging weapon against our ships.  
Of the four most recent attacks on U.S. naval ships, three were from mines. The 
first was on April 14, 1998, during Operation Earnest Will, the USS S. B. Roberts FFG-58 
ran into a submerged M-08 moored contact mine (Figure 6). This mine “blew a 20-foot 
hole in her hull, broke the keel, blew the engines off their mounts, and flooded the main 
engine room and other spaces” (Melia 1991). The damage to the USS Roberts was 
extensive and required $96 million to fix and was out of service for 13 months; all from a 
mine that cost $1,500 and was designed in 1908 (Khan 2010). Almost three years later 
the second and third attacks occurred to the USS Tripoli and the USS Princeton (Figure 
6), only a few hours apart. On February 18, 1991 the USS Tripoli LPH-10 hit a contact 
mine 50 miles off of Kuwait (Melia 1991). The mine punched a 16 by 25 foot hole in her 
hull, but she was able to remain on station. Then a few hours later and 10 miles away the 
USS Princeton CG-59 went over at least one possible two bottom influence mines which 
lifted ship out of the water and cracked her hull. The damage to the Tripoli was quite 
extensive to the midsection and one of two of the propellers. Both of the mine events that 
occurred on February 18, 1991 were in areas that were believed to be clear of mines. The 
total damage to the three ships was in excess of $123 million. Since the attacks on in 
1991 the U.S. MCM fleet has not gotten larger or significantly more modern.  
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a. b.  
c.  
 a. The damage to the hull of the USS Samuel B. Roberts on April 14, 1988.   b. Figure 6. 
Image of the USS Princeton’s cracked hull after sustaining damage from a Manta 
sea mine on February 18, 1991.  c. The USS Tripoli after running into a Mk-9 
contact mine on February 18, 1991 in the Persian Gulf.  
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III. MCM BACKGROUND 
A. MINE CLASSIFICATION 
1. Method of Delivery 
One of the first questions that must to be asked when trying to determine what 
mines an adversary has used in a minefield is what assets they have to deploy the sea 
mines. Sea mines can be deployed either by air, sea or by submarine, but many mines can 
be altered to be deployed by different assets. Depending on the assets available to deploy 
the mines in an adversaries inventory leads to where minefields may be located. When 
mine need to be deployed rapidly, usually for offensive purposes the preferred 
deployment method is by aircraft. Aircraft deployed mines can be deployed like bombs 
and comprise of majority of U.S. Navy arsenal of sea mines. Mines laid by surface assets 
can be deployed from a variety of ships, boats or even barges, which enables them to be 
deployed covertly. Submarine laid mines are generally larger in size and cylindrical, 
because they need to be launched from torpedo tubes. The United States utilizes it 
submarine launched mines for anti-submarine warfare (Table 1).   
2. Location in the Water Column 
Once you know how an adversary intends to deploy the mines you must concern 
yourself with were in the water column the mines are located (Figure 7). Just like there 
are three methods of deployment there are three locations in which the mine can be 
located. First, there are the bottom mines which can be located from the CLZ all the way 
to deep water. These mines are negatively buoyant and sink to the sea floor. Depending 
on the mine type, delivery method, and sediment type of the sea floor, bottom mines can 
become fully or partially buried. When the mine is not buried they are referred to as 
“proud” and are much easier to hunt. Due to being negatively buoyant by design the 
explosive charge can be much larger than that of a moored or drifting mine. The 
effectiveness of a bottom mine determined by: the depth of water, how large its explosive 
charge is, and the hull strength of the intended target. So, a small bottom mine, like the 
Italian made “Manta” (Table 1), would need to be in relatively shallow water (see Figure 
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8) to be effective against a surface ship. Since bottom mines are the only mines that can 
be buried, which mitigates the effectiveness of many sonar MCM systems, they can be a 
very hard mine to hunt (NAVSEA, 2007). Also many countries are now making the mine 




Table 1.   Countries sea mine inventories as of 1999 (from Watts, 1999) 
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 Mine Positions in the water column (from Ocean Studies Board, 2000) Figure 7. 
 
 Mine Warfare Regions (from PEO LMW, 2009) Figure 8. 
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Sea mines can also be located in the volume or in simple terms tethered 
somewhere between the surface and the bottom. This can be accomplished by having a 
positively buoyant mine that is tethered to an anchor/mooring. The length of the tether 
along with the crush depth of the mine case limits the depth at which the mines can be 
placed (NAVSEA 2007). The explosive charge and actuating mechanism are both located 
in the mine case. Since the case is positively buoyant, the amount explosive is less than 
that of a bottom mine, thereby reducing its effective damage radius. The Volume mines 
are designed to be effective against submarines and surface ships. Since moored mines 
have a long cable that attaches the mine to its mooring they a susceptible to mechanical 
mine sweeping (cutting of the tether). They can be moored very close to the surface so 
that even small boats with a very shallow draft can be at risk. There are two very 
interesting types of moored mine, homing or guide mines and the rising mine. The 
homing mine is similar to a moored torpedo or missile that once triggered it is guide to its 
target. The rising mine is a deeper moored mine but once it is triggered the mine case is 
released and the mine rises to the surface and detonates. 
Moving mines or drifting mines are positively or neutrally buoyant mines that are 
deployed in a way to be able to move with the currents. Drifting mines that are no longer 
tethered to their mooring are classified as floaters (NAVSEA 2007). True drifting mines 
have been ban by the 1907 Hague treaty, yet have been use on occasion since then. The 
advantage of drifting mines is that they can be deployed in any water depth and be 
affective. The main drawback of drifting mines apart from being banned is that they will 
travel randomly and possibly damage friendly and neutral shipping traffic as well as your 
adversaries. Consequently, drifting mines are usually fitted with a scuttling device that 
will cause the mine to sink and become inert after a certain period of time. Drifting mine 
may be located at the water surface or at a set depth below the service by using a depth-
controlling hydrostatic device. Often drifting mines will be attached to some innocent 
looking object like an abandoned boat or tethered to each other to increase probability of 
hitting a ship. 
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B. ACTUATION METHODS 
1. Contact 
Contact mines are the oldest and the most commonly seen mine that explosive 
ordinance and demolition (EOD) divers are neutralizing. The mine casing or a contact 
mechanism attached to the case must make contact with a ship or object for the mine to 
detonate. Contact mines have come a long way since the revolutionary war but the 
overall theories remains the same, sit and wait for a ship to run into it and blow up. The 
actuating mechanisms have gotten much more sophisticated and can be dormant in the 
water for long periods of time because they are not actively sensing or searching for a 
target. Contact mines that utilize a chemical horn can be harmful for many years after 
being deployed. The chemical horn contains a fragile vile of electrolyte, when the horn is 
struck the electrolyte flows into the battery, and energizes the firing circuit (NAVSEA 
2007). They are fairly simple and the least expensive mine, yet have caused almost 
$100,000,000 in damage to the U.S. Navy over the past 15 years. 
2. Command-Control  
Command-control or remote operated sea mines can be detonated by way of a 
command signal. This signal can be sent either wirelessly or via a cable from a land 
based control center (NAVSEA 2007). Controlled mines can be made safe, live or to 
detonate by the user a t any time. Controlled mines can also be influence mines and be 
armed when the user sends a signal. They can contain detection devices that signal a 
ships presence and allow the user to choose when to detonate. Command control mines 
are traditionally used defensively to protect harbor approaches but can be used 
offensively when controlled wirelessly. 
3. Influence 
Influence mines are actuated from a target created influence in the vicinity of the 
mine or by certain responses from active signals from the mine (NAVSEA 2007). The 
sensitivity setting can be adjusted on the mine to fine tune the mine for a specific type of 
ship or to reduce background noise in the location that it will be deployed. Influence 
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mines can be actuated from a variety of changes in the physical environment caused by a 
targets presence, such as magnetic, acoustic, and pressure. When a certain signal or 
combination of signals is detected, a signal is to the firing circuit to determine if the mine 
should detonate. Usually influence mines have two or three sensors and the most 
common combination being magnetic and acoustic. Since a combination of signals may 
be necessary for the mine to detonate makes the influence mine a very difficult mine to 
neutralize by sweeping. Also the use of more than one sensor provides better target 
discrimination. 
The magnetic sensor was the first influence mine that was developed in WWI by 
the British. The sensor was designed to sense a change in the Earth’s magnetic field when 
a target passes by. The sensor monitors a change in magnitude of the magnetic field. The 
two types of magnetic sensors used today are utilizing an induction coil or magneto-
resistant fluxgate. 
The acoustic sensors consist of passive hydrophones and a processing unit that 
detects underwater sounds and active transponders (NAVSEA 2007). The hydrophone is 
a passive system that listens for a noise generated by a targets engine, propeller, or 
machinery. The transponder is an active system that sends out acoustic signal at a 
suspected target to determine the validity of the target. Every ship, submarine and boat 
puts out its own unique acoustic signal which can be exploited by an acoustic mine. 
Acoustic mines are very versatile and can be designed operate passively to sense sounds 
from low frequencies (less than two Hz) to high frequencies (greater than 15 kHz) or can 
be active in which they use an active sonar to locate a target. 
A pressure sensor reacts to the hydrodynamic pressure field of a target as it passes 
(NAVSEA 2007). The pressure sensor is very susceptible to surface waves and as such is 
used in combination with other sensors. The pressure sensor monitors the slight 
hydrostatic pressure change caused by a passing ship while ignoring the large variation 
caused by waves. The huge advantage of this system is that it is impossible to simulate 
the pressure signature of the target ship, which makes it very hard to sweep. 
 24 
C. MCM TRIAD 
1. AMCM 
The airborne contingent of the Navy’s MCM “triad” is comprised of two 
squadrons of MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters (Figure 9) and a total of 28 helicopters. 
Both squadrons (HM-14 & HM-15) are being collocated at Naval Air Station Norfolk. 
The helicopters conduct minesweeping, mine hunting, and neutralizing operations; and 
can be airlifted anywhere in the world within 72 hours (PEO LMW 2009). The AMCM 
approach to MCM operation is one asset will conduct detection/classification operations 
and a follow on asset will conduct the neutralizing portion; this referred to as “bumper 
pool.”(NAVSEA 2007)  The Sea Dragons use the following MCM systems: 
• AQS-24: multi-beam side-looking mine-hunting sonar detects and 
classifies all types of seam mines in the water column.(PEO LMW 2009)   
• Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS): allows MILCO’s to be 
identified as mines or non-mine mine-like bottom objects (NOMBOs) 
(NAVSEA 2007) 
•  
• Mk 2(G): Acoustic Sweep often referred to as “rattle bars,” consists of 
parallel fixed and swinging pipes or bars that collide to produce medium- 
to high-frequency acoustic energy that detonates acoustic mines. 
(NAVSEA 2007) 
• Mk 103: Mechanical Sweep system is a modified consists of a rugged tow 
wire, chipper cutters, a depressor, otters, floats, and float pendants to 
target the mooring cables of shallow-water moored mines.(PEO LMW 
2009) 
• Mk 104 Acoustic Sweep is a self-rotating cavitating disk inside a venturi 
tube that generates cavitation sound signatures similar to a ship as it is 
towed by the helicopter, used to counter acoustic mines.(PEO LMW 2009) 
• Mk 105 Magnetic Sweep is an open-loop electrode to counter magnetic 
bottom mines. The Mk 105 consists of a gas turbine generator mounted on 
a hydrofoil sled. The generator produces direct current through the 
electrode array to create a magnetic field that replicates the magnetic 
signature of a surface ship.(NAVSEA 2007)) 
• Mk 106: Combination Sweep uses both the Mk 104 and Mk 105 sweeps 
and is effective against acoustic and magnetic mines. 
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2. SMCM 
The dedicated U.S. SMCM fleet comprises of 13 Avenger (MCM-1)-class ships 
as seen in Figure 9. Four are forward deployed in Bahrain, three are homeported in Japan; 
and the remaining seven are homeported in San Diego, California at the new Mine 
Warfare Center of Excellence. The avenger class ship like are able to perform sweeping, 
hunting and neutralizing of sea mines. The SMCM approach to MCM is that once an 
asset detects/classifies a MILCO, the same asset will identify and neutralize the contact 
before proceeding; this is referred to as the “blow as you go.”(NAVSEA 2007)  The 
Avenger-class ships are fitted with several systems to carry out mine countermeasures 
operations: 
• SQQ-32 variable-depth mine detection and classification sonar: This is a 
variable-depth sonar (VDS) that employs both a forward looking sonar 
(FLS) for detection and a scanning high-resolution sonar for classification. 
The sonar system can detect and classify moored and bottom mines. 
(NAVSEA 2007) 
• SLQ-37 Magnetic/Acoustic Influence Minesweeping System: Consists of 
an M Mk 5A open-loop electrode sweep combined with a TB 27 (for low 
frequency) or TB 26(for medium frequency) acoustic sweeping system to 
counter magnetic and acoustic mines. (NAVSEA 2009) 
• SLQ-38 (Mechanical) Minesweeping System: Is designed to cut the 
mooring cable of moored mines that are near the surface. The SLQ-38 
uses a rugged wire and cable cutters, and can be rigged on one or both 
sides of the minesweeper. (PEO LMW 2009) 
• SLQ-48(V) Mine Neutralization System (MNS): Is an unmanned 
submersible that can neutralize bottom and moored mines. After a contact 
is detected, the MNS is put in the water to reacquire the target, a low-light-
level television is then used to classify, and identify the contact. If the 
contact is identified as a mine, the MNS places an explosive charge next to 
the mine, the MNS is recovered, and the explosive charge destroys the 
mine. If the contact is a moored mine, the MNS will attach a charge on the 
cable near the mine case or cut the cable to allow the mine to surface, 
where it is neutralized. (PEO  LMW,2009) 
The problem with the Avenger surface mine countermeasures vessels are beyond 
the midpoints of their service lives, and the littoral combat ship (LCS) with its MIW 
module is not operational. 
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a.  b.  
 a. MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter performing mine sweeping operations.  Figure 9. 
b. Avenger-class MCM ship, USS Dextrous (MCM-13) underway. 
 
3. UMCM 
The third component of the “triad” is the underwater mine countermeasures 
(UMCM) force which comprises of the Navy’s EOD detachments that specialize in 
handling of unexploded ordnance (Figure 10). EOD MCM personnel directly support 
mine-hunting and clearance operations using specialized countermeasures-unique 
equipment to locate, identify, neutralize or recover sea mines or underwater improvised 
explosive devices (UIEDs). EOD personnel use hand-held sonars, various unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUVs) equipped with side scan sonar (SSS), and the Marine 
Mammal System (MMS) with its inherent, organic sonar capability. When EOD recovers 
an adversaries mine, it can be disassemble to determine how they work, type of sensors 
used, setting for the sensors, and the mines intended target. Then Based on these data and 
assessments, the MCMC can better utilize the MCM resources. Synthetic Aperture Sonar 
(SAS) on UUVs are now in the tested phase and will provide a long-range, faster 
coverage rate, and higher-resolution sonar than the SSS that is used today. The MMS is 
the best performing minehunting system in the Fleet and can even find buried mines 
(Figure 10). These specially trained bottlenose dolphins and sea lions excel in mine 
detection and neutralization, swimmer defense, and recovery of mines, torpedoes, and 
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other objects. Unfortunately, the area coverage rate of the MMS is low and the logistics 
to bring in a MMS system is very high. EOD personnel provide a wealth of information 
about an adversary’s mines and their capabilities. 
 
 EOD divers neutralizing a moored mine and a MMS in detecting a mine  Figure 10. 
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF MIW 
A. CURRENTS AND TIDES 
In MIW currents and tides play a large part because they directly influence the 
ability to neutralize mines and to some degree the ability to detect mines.  Currents are 
flows of water that take place over time, and comes from different processes such as tides 
and direct wind forcing. Many UMCM mine hunting assets are limited by strong currents 
especially currents that are tidally influenced in harbor channels and shipping routes. 
Most MNVs and EOD divers have relatively low limits with regards to currents and when 
currents are near the operational limits the time needed to perform tasks can be extended.   
Currents are long-time-scale fluid flows arising from a wide variety of processes, 
such as seawater density gradients, direct wind forcing, and tides. Meteorological and 
oceanographic analysis, prior to mine warfare activities in the coastal zone, must be 
sophisticated enough to understand the complexities of forces driving current flow, 
determine how these forces are interacting with each other, understand the time scale of 
variability driving current flow, and understand how this may affect the mission (Ocean 
Studies Board, 2000). When currents are high moored mines may become submerged or 
drift (do to moving of the anchor), whereas if currents are less extreme the mines may be 
surfaced and the mooring not drift. Drifting mines rely on currents to move them into 
location like ports and harbors or in channels or restricted water ways, which are often 
over a hundred miles from where the mines were deployed. To fully take into account 
how to best work within limitations of unites in depth tidal and current models must be 
used. This has been known by many units and requests for current and tidal models from 
the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVO) is usually requested for MIW support 
Tides vary from place to place and in some location the changes in sea surface 
depth is very small, but in other locations, like the Bay of Fundy, the fluctuation can be 
over 50 feet. Tidal effects are relevant to MIW operations when the depth of water is 
shallow as in the VSW and the SZ but also in the ports and harbors where tidally driven 
current can easily exceed three knots. Mines and obstacles in the SZ can be submerged 
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and not visible while the tide is high, but be when the tide goes out the SZ minefield may 
be fully exposed. In the surf zone the ability to neutralize obstructions and mines is 
dependent on the water depth and of when MILCO that are being prosecuted are in the 
wave breaking region the mission becomes very complex. Timing missions around tides 
and low currents is a must for successful and safe operations (Ocean Studies Board 
2000). 
B. BATHYMETRY 
The bathymetry or water depth can influence the strength of currents, the location 
and size of breaking waves and the tidal range (Ocean Studies Board 2000). In the SZ 
changes in bathymetry occur with the tide, while in deeper waters changes in bathymetry 
occur at much slower rates. By looking at the bathymetry, one can see the deeper 
channels that are conducive to stronger currents and plane operations accordingly. Also 
when there is an offshore bank, the areas adjacent to the bank will experience focusing of 
surface waves which can be detrimental to diver operations (Ocean Studies Board 2000). 
Knowledge of the bathymetry in the SZ and VSW regions is key for UMCM operations. 
Bathymetry is a boundary condition for near shore waves and currents which lead 
to scouring and or burying of mines (Ocean Studies Board 2000). The more mine are 
scoured the harder it is for mine detection and many sensors of mines are not seriously 
impacted by burial making the mines just as effective. The bathymetry also affects the 
location that certain mines can be effective and where there are large fluctuations in 
bathymetry mines can drift to deeper areas where they may be more or less effective. 
When there is a significant slope in bathymetry the mines can be funneled to the bottom 
of a channel; when this happens, there can be a lot of other clutter making the mines very 
hard to find. Understanding the bathymetry allows the MCMC to better plan operations 
around mined areas.  
C. WATER CLARITY 
Water clarity is very important to UMCM EOD divers and their ability to detect, 
classify, identify, re-acquire and neutralize mines. Water clarity does not just affect the 
EOD divers but every branch of the MCM triad because when water clarity is extremely 
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poor the ability to neutralize mines is very difficult because the MNVs utilize optical 
sensors. Water clarity is determined by many factors including, absorption and scattering 
by phytoplankton, suspended sediments, detrital particles, and dissolved organic material 
(Ocean Studies Board 2000). The scattering of light by these particles obscures the ability 
to see the mines and obstacles, while the absorption of light by the same particles darkens 
the area which also decreases visibility. Another element that factors into visibility is the 
type of sediment that is on the ocean floor because if a diver or MNV disturbs the ocean 
floor the water clarity can be adversely affected. Understanding what effects and how 
water clarity affects operations is critical to planning and creating reasonable timelines.  
D. DOCTRINAL BOTTOM TYPE 
Doctrinal bottom type (DBT) is broken into three parts, roughness, clutter, and 
bottom composition. All three parts affect MIW and the ability to detect and classify 
mines. Roughness is a measure of the ridge or sand wave height in an area. Clutter is the 
Non-Mine, Mine-Like Bottom Objects (NOMBOs) density occurring in a square nautical 
mile. Bottom composition is broken into three categories, rock, mud and sand, but also 
adds the amount of burial as a discriminating factor. Once all three parts of are taken into 
account a letter and number designator are given per Figure 11.  
Roughness is determined by the amount and height of sand ridges in an area. 
Large amounts and relatively tall sand waves affect side scan sonar (SSS) imagery in 
very negative ways by causing shadow regions that can mask or obscure mines. If a mine 
shape is located between two sand ridges the mine may not be able to be detected because 
the size and shape that is seen in the imagery could not appear to be mine like. There are 
three categories of roughness, smooth(less than 20cm), moderate (20cm through 30 cm), 
and rough (greater than 30cm). Areas that are smooth are better for MCM operations 
while rough areas are not. 
Clutter is the number part of the designator and its value is not influenced by the 
other two parts. Getting the clutter value is very straight forward and is determined by 
how much debris and trash that may appear to be mine like but are not that are on the 
ocean floor. When the number of NOMBOs is less than four per square kilometer that the 
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clutter value is 1, greater than four and less than 12 NOMBOs per kilometer the value is 
2, and when there are greater than 12 NOMBOs per kilometer the value is 3. When the 
value is higher the ability to hunt becomes more difficult because it of a much larger 
amount of objects on the ocean floor that appear to be mines.  
Bottom composition is the most important aspect of DBT because it has burial 
included as one of its attributes. The amount of burial can change an area from huntable 
to unhuntable where clutter and roughness can only change the amount of effort that 
needs to be applied. Bottom composition brings in roughness and provides the letter 
designator for the DBT, which is the bottom category. Bottom categories range from “A,” 
which is the optimum minehunting seafloor, to the worst case of “D,” which is typified as 
a high burial environment (Ocean Studies Board 2000). The Bottom composition is 
broken into three sediment types, rock, mud, and sand. When the sediment type is rock 
there is no burial but the bottom category starts out at “B” and is often difficult to detect 
MILCOs do to large rocks obstructing SSS imagery. Mud and Sand are usually better for 
minehunting except when the burial is greater than 75 percent because the amount of 
mine that is visible has decreased to the point where they are very hard to detect. As per 
Figure 11, the DBT for an area with 11 NOMBOs per square kilometer, 25 cm sand 
















 DBT definitions used for MIW making as defined by MCM doctrine  Figure 11. 
(from Ocean Studies Board, 2000) 
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V. COASTAL BATTLEFIELD RECONNAISSANCE & ANALYSIS 
(COBRA)  
A. RAPID OVERT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE (ROAR) DATA 
Mine warfare is a balance of time versus risk. In effort to reduce the amount of 
time and risk involved in mine countermeasures, it is in the interest of the warfighter to 
unmanned aerial sensors to detect moored and submerged target in a given location of 
interest. The ROAR sensor is part of the COBRA program and the COBRA program is 
part the detection capability for the ABS (PEO LCS 2011). COBRA’s mission is to 
conduct unmanned, aerial, tactical reconnaissance in the littoral battle space to detect and 
localize mine fields and obstacles in the surf and beach zones prior to an amphibious 
assault (PEO LCS 2011). The COBRA module will be housed in the MQ-8B Fire Scout 
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) (PEO LCS 2011). 
This VTUAV is part of the littoral combat ships (LCS) MCM mission module and allows 
operators to be at a safe operating distance while surveying a hostile surf zone (SZ) and 
craft landing zone (CLZ). 
The capability progression of COBRA is broken into three initial increments 
(blocks) of development with each introducing new or enhanced capabilities (Almquist 
2009). Block I is a passive system with capabilities of daytime surface-laid mine line and 
obstacle detection in the beach zone, limited detection capability in surf zone, and off-
board processing (Figure 12). Block II will add night-time minefield and obstacle 
detection capability and full detection capability in surf zone (Figure 12). Block III will 
add buried mine line detection capability and near real-time onboard processing (Figure 
12). None of the increment involve a computer aided detection and classification 
(CAD/CAC) algorithm, thereby requiring all of the data to be analyzed by a human 
operator to detect the mines and obstacles. 
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 Progression of COBRA development from block I through block III  Figure 12. 
(from Almquist 2009) 
The block I COBRA module will consist of three primary components, the sensor 
module, Post Mission Analysis (PMA) station, and a Tactical Control System (TCS) for 
the VTUAV ground control station. The ground control station will be able to plan the 
flight plan, monitor and reprogram the flight path depending on the needs of the mission. 
The Block I key components include a highly stabilized, step stare, digital gimbal, high 
resolution multispectral imaging digital camera with spinning six-color filter wheel, a 
processing unit, and a solid state data storage unit. The overall payload weight of the 
cobra module weighs less than 150 pounds. At the end of each mission the data on the 
data storage unit is exported onto the COBRA PMA station onboard the LCS to be 
analyzed. The sensors will have detection capability in the BZ during the day time. 
The block II COBRA module will incorporate the ROAR system will use a Lite 
Cycles Incorporated (LCI) integrated scanner, detector, and telescope (ISDT) (Almquist 
2007). The new sensor will allow for night operations and add the detection capability in 
BZ, SZ and VSW regions. This new module will utilize an active multi-spectral true 3-D 
LIDAR system that is optimized for day and night time operations in the SZ (Almquist 
2012). The Sensor will have a multi-look scan pattern for operations in high-clutter SZ 
environment to help reduce the number of false alarms. The size of the block II system 
will also be very compact so that the module will be able to on a tactical unmanned aerial 
vehicle. 
The block III will add buried mine field detection in the BZ as well as near real 
time data processing (Almquist 2012). The module will utilize active and passive imagers 
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and a Laser Interferometric Sensor (LIS) to detect buried mines. The LIS is a laser-based 
electro-optic imaging technique that is utilized with an acoustic source on a VTUAV to 
detect buried mines. This is done by measuring the vibration of the ground above the 
buried mines and comparing it with the ground of the surrounding ground.   
B. FORT WALTON ROAR EXPERIMENT 
During September and October of 2009, the Office of Naval Research conducted 
a experiment utilizing the ROAR sensor by Fort Walton, Florida. The experiment was 
conducted in the SZ and VSW regions with mission tracks parallel to the coastline. The 
region had a gradual sloping seafloor which is typical of the gulf coast, yet the SZ is very 
dynamic and complex due to foam, surface glint, waves and clutter (Almquist 2012). The 
survey was conducted using a Flash LIDAR imager that was mounted on a helicopter that 
was fling at 70 knots and an altitude of 2500ft to 3000ft. 
The survey data that was used for this thesis was the 2-D LIDAR data. The 
horizontal area was 200 x 200 meters represented by a 1000 x 780 pixel horizontal image. 
The reason that the 3-D LIDAR data was not utilized was that the contrast difference 
between data points was very limited and only provided eight shades of grey, whereas the 
2-D LIDAR data was consistently greater than 25 shades of grey.   
1. CAD/CAC 
The goal of this research is to develop a computer-aided detection (CAD) 
algorithm to detect MILCOs in the SZ. Unfortunately, here has not been any research on 
this specific topic to date, i.e., that utilizes a CAD/CAC algorithm for a LIDAR sensor. 
The algorithm used in this paper was developed utilizing a method called feature 
extraction, which was used by the Raytheon Company (Ciany et al. 2003). This method 
utilized areas of highlights and areas of shadows that are geometrically associated to form 
regions of interest. Each point was then processed to extract key differences in the signal 
to noise ratios. By comparing regions with low contrasts or shadows to areas of increased 
brightness the algorithm was able to distinguish between background noise and MILCOs. 
This algorithm also utilized the 20 images of MILCOs that was provided by BAE as a 
 38 
reference to what was mine like and what was not. Also, the BAE images where used to 




The first step that was taken for this work getting the images from the mine 
shapes from the analysts from BAE. Utilizing the images of the mine shapes, work could 
be commenced into sorting out how to systematically break down the imagery. The area 
that the imagery was taken from was a sandy beach which was relatively flat and with 
almost no clutter or large rocks in the SZ or CLZ. This helped a lot in the analysis 
because it allowed many assumptions to be made. Evaluating the imagery was similar to 
looking for someone wearing a black jacket in a field of snow, there was not much 
clutter, roughness, or burial that had to be considered into the equation. The mine shapes 
were mostly circular in nature (that were found by the BAE analysts) except for a few 
hedgehog obstructions. The method to locate these mine like objects (MLOs) was broken 
into 7 sequential steps. The algorithm starts with the image saved from the BAE browser 
(Figure 13). One of the main factors that played into developing this algorithm was to 
make it simple yet powerful enough to locate the MLOs without a high false alarm rate. 
The MATLAB code used for this thesis is located in Appendix A. 
 
  The initial imagery of a MLO Figure 13. 
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B. 7 STEPS 
1. Step 1 Reduce the Search Area  
The first step, once the image was taken out of the BAE browser was to reduce 
the size of the image to only the relevant/usable imagery. The raw image started off 
having a large border that went all around the usable area that needed to be removed. 
Next, many of the images had up to half of the un-bordered image that was dark; again 
these sections were taken out. The resulting area of the usable image was a rectangular 
area that was carried onto into the second step. 
There were two reasons for first removing the bad sections and the border. First, 
was so that the computational time would not be wasted analyzing sections of unusable 
data. Second, was to not have the contrast values skewed in later steps. This was done by 
quickly analyzing the data on the x and y axis and if the mean value was less than four 
percent (very dark) the area would be removed (Figure 14).    
 
 Step reducing the search area Figure 14. 
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2. Step 2 Reduce the Search Points 
The area from step one was significantly reduced from the initial image but, still 
there were large areas in the data that could not have a MILCO in them. Large sections of 
the raw data were very saturated or very bright and the MILCOs were all very dark. The 
points that were greater than the mean brightness value for the image were removed as 
well. The data that was kept and moved on to step 5 was the red portion in Figure 15. 
 
  Removes areas with large brightness values Figure 15. 
3. Step 3 Calculate the Mean Darkness Value (Rate) within 0.5R Disk 
At each point, a disk that is half the radius of the mine being searched for will be 
analyzed. Each point of raw data from step two will now have a circle around it. The 
disks will then be analyzed and the mean darkness or rate of the disk will be recorded. 




4. Step 4 Darkness at Center 
The MILCO must have the disks minimum rate in the center. This step was put in 
because often times many points whose rate met the criteria were overlapping. This step 
analyzes the overlapping points and only the point whose darkest area was in the center is 
sent to the next step as possibly being a MILCO. This is done by comparing the rate of 
each circle around a point and if the darkest region is not at the center of the disk the 
contact is no longer kept. This step is very useful because it not only reduces the amount 
of overlapping points, but it also eliminates points that are relatively dark, but not dark in 
the center (Figure 16). If a contact is not dark in the center it was found that it did not 
correlate with the found MILCOs from the BAE analysts.  
 
 Object must be greater than .2 of the mean darkness value Figure 16. 
5. Step 5 Calculate the Mean Value of the Ring 
In this step the points that have been moved on from step 4 are used to make a 
ring 1.5 to 2 times the radius of the target mine. The mean brightness value is calculated 
and is called the mean ring value. The value of the ring should be much brighter than that 
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of the disk which is dark. The mean rings value is compared to the mean disk value to get 
a relative darkness value or rate value using the following equation:  
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 −𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑘
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
The last part of this step is sorting the rate values from lowest to highest. 
6. Step 6 Rate >= 0.2 
This step removes the points with low relative darkness and has two parts that 
work together to further remove the points of no concern. First, if the rate from the points 
of step 5 are less than or equal to 0.2 were eliminated as seen in Figure 17. This was done 
because if the rate was low, they were indicative of noise in the data and not a MILCO. 
The next step was to compare the remaining points against the point directly below it in 
relative darkness. This part was done to find jumps in the rate values. These jumps 
between the rate values were called relative rate (rr). The equation for rr is: 
𝑟𝑟i = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒i 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒i-1 
7. Step 7 rr + drr >= 2.2 
This last step applies a criteria equation; if a contact meets the set criteria than the 
contact is mine like and would be considered a MILCO as seen in Figure 18.  This last 
step is broken into three parts. First, a new variable was created called difference of 
relative rate (drr) whose equation is: 
𝑑𝑟𝑟i = rri - rri-1 
This new variable was used to show the differences between large jumps in contrast 
between points. Second, the rr and drr for each point are summed together and saved as 
that points critical value. After much analysis a minimum critical value was determined 
to be 2.2 after much testing with the known contacts. If a points critical value was greater 
than or equal to the minimum critical value the contact was considered a MILCO. Third, 
the imagery of the MILCOs are exported as a jpg file for an operator to view (Figure 18) 
along with a text file that has the number of contacts, the rr value and drr values for each 
contact. The images that did not have any MILCO were not sent to the operator. 
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 Reduce the points to only the largest jumps in darkness values Figure 17. 
 
 Apply the final search criteria to detect MILCOs Figure 18. 
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VII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RESULTS 
The overall results from the CAD/CAC algorithm were very positive, with all of 
the MILCO’s from the BAE analysts being found with the algorithm. The original goal 
was to analyze the 3D ROAR data but the resolution was to low when exporting the 
imagery to remove the noise from the MILCOs.  So the 2D data was used instead and the 
algorithm was able to locate all twenty of the contacts with out and false alarms 
(detecting a contact that was not a contact). The problem was that not all of the imagery 
was a pristine as the images where the MILCOs were detected. Also the MILCOs were 
not in the locations that the ground truth said they were. Overall, the algorithm performed 
the task that it was designed for, yet improvements in the future could be made. 
The 3D ROAR data was the original goal because the imagery allowed the user to 
determine were in the water column the MILCO was located. Each section of data would 
have 44 layers with the first layer starting above the water and the last layer ending below 
the sea floor. This resulted in many images being unusable, but there were between four 
to ten images (depending on the depth of the water) of imagery through the water 
column. This imagery could be used to determine if a MILCO was moored which would 
have an image near the top to display the mine case and then in a later image the mooring 
or if the MILCO was a bottom mine. When going through the browser manually and 
viewing all the 3D imagery was very time consuming and it was very possible that a 
human operator could miss detecting a mine if they stopped looking a the browser for any 
period of time. When the raw 3D imagery was exported from the browser there were only 
eight shades of grey. The background noise was too high for the 7 step algorithm to 
distinguish a between a MILCO and the background. The algorithm was changed 
repeatedly but in order to locate the surf zones mines from the BAE analysis’s the false 
alarm rate was such that almost every slide detected a MILCO. When looking at the 
exported 2D ROAR data it was found that the contrast was much better with over 50 
shades of grey, and was usable for this experiment. 
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The BAE analysis’s located 20 MILCOs in the surf zone from the experiment in 
2009. The contacts fell into two categories, moored contacts and submerged contacts. 
The first MILCO that the BAE analyst identified was correlated well with the 7 step 
algorithm. The algorithm also detected the surface float that was attached to the mooring 
that the analysts indicated with the yellow arrow in Figure 19. This was a good example 
of the difference between the 2D and 3D data sets, because the 2 D image was able to 
show float and the mooring in one image where the 3D imagery had the float on a earlier 
image than the mooring. The addition of the mooring in this case was not documented as 
a false alarm. Overall the BAE analysts identified four moored contacts with their 
associated floats. The seven step algorithm located three of the four floats in the imagery 
and all of the moorings. The complete set of all the surf zone mine locations is found in 
Appendix A. 
The analysis from BAE also indicated 16 subsurface MILCO’s ranging from 
small (Figure 20) to large (Figure 21) and in some imagery there were multiple contacts 
(Figure 22). The Small contacts were very small on the 2D imagery and the contrast was 
less than 25 shades of grey. The larger contacts were much more obvious and easy to 
pick out. When the algorithm had to find multiple subsurface contacts in a single image is 
when the false alarm rate was higher. In Figure 22 the two contacts that the BAE analysts 
found were also found by the algorithm, but the algorithm also detected a third contact 
that was between the two MILCOs that appears to be a false alarm. Two of the contacts 
did not appear to be mines, but obstacles like a hedgehog, which is designed to damage 
tanks as they come ashore (Figure 23). The hedgehog has multiple straight shadow 
regions that resemble a star rather than a circle, but is still an obstacle that would have to 
be dealt with. 
The false alarm rate for the imagery was very low at .09 with only two false 
alarms. One of the false alarms occurred when there were multiple contacts and the false 
alarm had an interesting shape to it but was not characteristic of the other mine shapes 




imagery similar to that of a MILCO. The higher the false alarm rate the more assets time 
that would need to be dedicated to investigate and the MILCOs which can significantly 
extend the MCM timelines. 
 
 Moored contact from BAE with algorithm results in lower left corner Figure 19. 
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 Small subsurface contact from BAE with algorithm results  Figure 20. 
in lower left corner 
 
 Large subsurface contact from BAE with algorithm results  Figure 21. 
in lower left corner 
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 Multiple subsurface contact from BAE with algorithm results  Figure 22. 
in lower left corner 
 
 Hedghog subsurface contact from BAE with algorithm results  Figure 23. 
in lower left corner 
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In addition to the 20 images of MILCOs from BAE, an additional 100 images 
were randomly taken from a mission on October 3, 2009. This data set was chosen 
because it contained images that BAE analyzed as mine like and the track of the 
helicopter went directly through the surf zone mine field. The 20 images that BAE had 
shown had very good images and the ability to see through the water column was very 
clear but the majority images were not of this quality. The images were broken down into 
four categories: good (which were like the 20 in the BAE analysis), partial, dark, and 
surface.   
The good images are like the ones previously seen. The partial images had some 
usable imagery but some there were portions that were removed (Figure 24). The dark 
images were images where the image was almost completely dark and contrast needed to 
adjusted to view the image (Figure 25). The surf image was one in which the image 
exported was of the sea surface and were mostly waves (Figure 25). Of the 100 additional 
images that were analyzed 20 were good, 51 were partial, 10 were surface, and 19 were 
dark. When the imagery was not good the false alarm rate increased and possible missed 
calls could emerge. 
The partial images made up the majority of the images that were seen in all the 
data sets. Also the partial images were only the partial images that did not have surface 
return or were very dark, but partially good imagery. The 7 step algorithm was not able 
work very well in the border regions of the unusable imagery as seen in Figure 24. This 
problem occurred in 4 of the images and mines were detected erroneously. The overall 
false alarm rate in the partial images was 27.3 percent with eleven contacts called and 
three of which were erroneous.  The dark images occurred at about the same rate as the 
good imagery and forced the operator to pause and adjust the contrast to view the 
imagery and then reset the contrast before proceeding onto the next image (Figure 25).  
This was very time consuming and the overall process inefficient. The 7 step algorithm 
called three MILCOs with only 1 being obviously incorrect, for a False alarm rate of 33.3 
percent. The surface images were the least seen but the most problematic (Figure 26).  
The images with surface return varied in contrast immensely which acted like a high 
clutter and rough bottom type which this algorithm was not designed for. In the ten 
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images in this random sampling one of the images had a false alarm. The overall false 
alarm rate for the surface images was 100 percent.  Overall the false alarm rate was 22.7 
percent over the 100 random images. 
  
 Images that was only partially usable Figure 24. 
  
 Images of the raw image and then after the 7 step algorithm Figure 25. 
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 Images of surface return of the water Figure 26. 
B. CONCLUSION  
This research was intended to show that a CAD/CAC program could and would 
be effective with the new COBRA sensor. The time needed to fully analyze the ROAR 
data was very tedious to the point of almost being tactically irrelevant. The 7 step 
algorithm was able to find the MILCO effectively in a low clutter, low roughness 
environment when the imagery was good. The algorithm was much faster at going 
through the imagery than human operator. The goal was to develop an algorithm that 
could detect and classify a MILCO, but the resolution was insufficient to classify the 
MILCOs beyond whether the MILCO was moored or a bottom contact. Lastly this 
research was intended to show that a CAD/CAC program was capable of finding 
MILCOs in the SZ and CLZ, but a more robust program is needed to handle the varying 
DBT environments that will be encountered. 
It should be noted that when the imagery was not good the false alarm rate rose 
greatly and the effectiveness of the algorithm dwindled. Also this algorithm is dependent 
on knowing the mine size; if the mine size is unknown the effectiveness of the algorithm 
is unknown. The imagery georectification was off by more than 30 meters at times 
making it impossible to correlate the image to the ground truth. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
To further the research presented in this paper, a larger and more updated data 
would be imperative. With a newer COBRA sensor currently being developed a good 
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deal of the imagery problems will be corrected and resolution should be enhanced. 
Updating the current algorithm utilizing the updated sensor could be very beneficial. 
A standalone CAD/CAC program is helpful, but having the CAD/CAC program 
incorporated into the actual browser would be much more effective. Developing a way to 
be able to plug a CAD/CAC program into the browser would be much more effective. 
The ability to update and allow the user to see the results of the program at the same time 
as they are seeing the imagery would also be very beneficial. 
The latitude and longitude of all the contacts that BEA found were mine like did 
not correlate to the ground truth of the mine field. Developing a way to georectify the 
imagery so that MILCOs can be reacquired is essential to prosecuting and neutralizing 
threats. Utilizing the Gimbal information, altitude, along with the latitude and longitude 
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APPENDIX B MATLAB CODE 




%      ‘slide4/’,’slide5/’,’slide6/’,... 
%      ‘slide7/’,’slide7/’,’slide8/’,... 
%      ‘slide9/’,’slide10/’,’slide11/’,... 
%      ‘slide12/’,’slide13/’,’slide14/’,... 
%      ‘slide15/’,’slide16/’,’slide17/’,... 
%      ‘slide18/’,’slide19/’,’slide20/’,... 
%      ‘slide21/’}; 
% fnm={‘2d_169192_red.bmp’,’2d_169193_NIR.bmp’,’2d_169222_red.bmp’,... 
%      ‘2d_169388_NIR.bmp’,’2d_169378_red.bmp’,’2d_169380_GRN.bmp’,... 
%      ‘2d_169386_GRN.bmp’,’2d_169387_red.bmp’,’2d_169449_GRN.bmp’,... 
%      ‘2d_169452_GRN.bmp’,’2d_207075.bmp’,’2d_207078.bmp’,... 
%      ‘2d_207086.bmp’,’2d_207089.bmp’,’2d_207154.bmp’,... 
%      ‘2d_207183_GRN.bmp’,’2d_228321_GRN.bmp’,’2d_228607_RED.bmp’,... 
%      ‘2d_228612_GRN.bmp’,’2d_210919_RED.bmp’,’2d_210996_GRN.bmp’,... 
%      ‘2d_211058_NIR.bmp’}; 
% OSZ=[16,14,16,... 
%      16,16,16,... 
%      16,16,16,... 
%      16,16,16,... 
%      16,16,16,... 
%      16,16,16,... 
%      16,16,16,... 




    filename=[int2str(k),’.bmp’]; 
    data=double(imread(filename)); 
  
    data=flipud(data); 
     
    Obj=identifyObjnew(data,16,1); 
  
    if ~isempty(Obj) 
        eval([‘ObjV’,int2str(k),’=ObjV;’]); 
  
        svinsert([filename(1:end-4),’new’],4); 
        
        %  check 
        tt=ObjV(:,3:4); 
        ss=[‘k=‘,int2str(k),’  ‘,filename,’  Obj 
number=‘,int2str(size(Obj,1))]; 
        disp(ss); 
        disp(tt); 
        fprintf(fid,’%s\n’,ss); 
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        fprintf(fid,’%10.4f %10.4f\n’,tt’); 
    end 
end 
fclose(fid); 
B. FIND OBJECT 
function Obj = identifyObjnew(data,R,plt,maxObj) 
% function Obj = identifyObjnew(data,R,plt,maxObj); 
% must input: 
%  data: 2-D data 
%  R: the radius of objector (index) 
%  plt: image plot key ( 1-plot 0-no plot ) 
%  maxObj: maximum number of Objector (defult: 3) 
  
ngin=nargin; 
if(ngin < 2), error(‘Not enough input arguments.’); end 
  
if ~exist(‘plt’,’var’), plt=0; maxObj=3; end 
if ~exist(‘maxObj’,’var’), maxObj=3; end 
  
p2=0.5; Critdrr=2.2;  Obj=[]; 
  
%           -----  STEP 1: reduce the search area  ------ 
%  
%       Many data files have large areas in which the data is not 
usable. 
%       Reducing the area in which MATLAB needs to analize reduces 
%       processesing time and therefore war fighter timelines. 








    xl=0.02; xd=0.48; xdd=xd+0.01; 
    yl=0.01; yd=0.3; ydd=yd+0.03; 
    figure(‘units’,’inches’,’position’,[2,2,7,8]); 
    axes(‘position’,[xl,yl+2*ydd,xd,yd],’xlim’,[1,Mx],’ylim’,[1,My],... 
        ‘xtick’,[],’ytick’,[],’fontsize’,8); hold on; 
    pcolor(data); shading flat; hold on; 
    colormap(‘gray’); 
    title(‘Original Data’); drawnow; 
end 
  




ii=find(xmean>tclin); I1=max(I1,ii(1)); I2=min(I2,ii(end)); 




    
axes(‘position’,[xl+xdd,yl+2*ydd,xd,yd],’xlim’,[1,Mx],’ylim’,[1,My],... 
        ‘xtick’,[],’ytick’,[],’fontsize’,8); hold on; 
    pcolor(data); shading flat; hold on; 
    colormap(‘gray’); 
    plot([I1,I2,I2,I1,I1],[J1,J1,J2,J2,J1],’w--’,’linewidth’,1); 










%   -----  Step2: Reduce the search points as only consider <50% ----- 
%  
%       The raw data has areas in which the sensor has become saturated 
and 
%       the data is not usable. 
%       reducing the area further to remove the saturated data regions 
%       further reduces processing time. 
%       Only consider the points less than the middle brightness 









    axes(‘position’,[xl,yl+ydd,xd,yd],’xlim’,[1,Mx],’ylim’,[1,My],... 
            ‘xtick’,[],’ytick’,[],’fontsize’,8); hold on; 
    pcolor(data); shading flat; hold on; 
    colormap(‘gray’); 
    plot([I1,I2,I2,I1,I1],[J1,J1,J2,J2,J1],’w--’,’linewidth’,1); 
    plot(XX(JI12),YY(JI12),’r.’); 
    title(‘Step2: Reduce the search points’); drawnow;  
end 
  
%------ Step3: Calculate the mean value within 0.5R disk ------ 
%       the relative index within 0.5R disk. 
%       calulate the mean darkness value of half the radius of the 
given  
%       mine that is to be search for  
r=Hr; 
  
[Xr,Yr]=meshgrid(-IHr:IHr,-IHr:IHr);        % sub region 
ii=find(Xr.^2+Yr.^2<=r^2); 
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ji_disk=My*Xr(ii)+Yr(ii);           % relative disk global index 
N=length(ji_disk); 
  





    JI=ones(N,1)*JI12(Midx(k)+1:Midx(k+1))+ji_disk*ones(1,Msub(k)); 
    meanji=cat(2,meanji,mean(data(JI))); 
end 
  




%---   Step4: The objector must be: minimum disk mean value at the disk 
center 
%      (dark). --- 
%      When multiple dark area are overlapping, only the darkest 
(center)  
%      is kept for future evaluation. 
ji0=[]; mean_disk=[]; 
for k=1:20 
    JI=ones(N,1)*JI12(Midx(k)+1:Midx(k+1))+ji_disk*ones(1,Msub(k)); 
    [Tmin,j0]=min(data2(JI)); 
    i0=find(j0==(N+1)/2 & Tmin>0.05*Tmax);  







    
axes(‘position’,[xl+xdd,yl+ydd,xd,yd],’xlim’,[1,Mx],’ylim’,[1,My],... 
            ‘xtick’,[],’ytick’,[],’fontsize’,8); hold on; 
    pcolor(data); shading flat; hold on; 
    colormap(‘gray’); 
    plot([I1,I2,I2,I1,I1],[J1,J1,J2,J2,J1],’w--’,’linewidth’,1); 
    plot(XX(ji0),YY(ji0),’ro’); 
    title(‘Step4: Darkness at center’); drawnow; 
end 
     
if isempty(ji0), return; end 
  
% -- Step5: Calculate the mean value of the ring (1.5R <= r <= 2R), --  
%    and sort the rate  
%    (relative difference value = (mean_ring-mean_disk)/mean_disk). 
%    The dark disks from step 4 is taken and then a ring is calculated 
%    around the dark region that is between 1.5 and 2 times the radius 
of the 
%    objector (Mine). This new ring should be much brighter than the 
dark 
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%    disk that it is encircling. Calculates the relative darkness 
%    difference between the out ring the dark disk in the center. 
Lastly 
%    sorts the relative darknes values from lowest to highest. 
  
[Xr,Yr]=meshgrid(-IR2:IR2,-IR2:IR2);        % sub region 
XYr=sqrt(Xr.^2+Yr.^2); 
ii=find(XYr>=1.5*R & XYr<=2*R); 
i_ring=Xr(ii); j_ring=Yr(ii); 









    meanring=NaN*ones(1,Msub(k)); 
    JI=ones(N,1)*ji0(Midx(k)+1:Midx(k+1))+ji_ring*ones(1,Msub(k)); 
    I=ones(N,1)*i0(Midx(k)+1:Midx(k+1))+i_ring*ones(1,Msub(k)); 
    J=ones(N,1)*j0(Midx(k)+1:Midx(k+1))+j_ring*ones(1,Msub(k)); 
    minI=min(I); maxI=max(I); minJ=min(J); maxJ=max(J); 
    ii= minI>=1 & maxI<=Mx & minJ>=1 & maxJ<=My; 
    if sum(ii)>0 
        meanring(ii)=mean(data(JI(:,ii))); 
    end 
    ii= minI<1 | maxI>Mx | minJ<1 | maxJ>My; 
    if sum(ii)>0 
        ii=find(ii>0); 
        for j=1:length(ii) 
            i=ii(j); 
            jj= I(:,i)>=1 & I(:,i)<=Mx & J(:,i)>=1 & J(:,i)<=My; 
            meanring(i)=mean(data(JI(jj,i))); 
        end 
    end 









i0=i0(idx); j0=j0(idx);  mean_disk=mean_disk(idx); 
  
%--- Step6: only consider rate>=0.2 then cut the data to  
%           the maximum objector number on highst rate. 
%           Any thing less than 20 percent relative darknes is not  
%           consided for future steps. Compare the relative darkness 
values 
%           to the relative darkness value directly behind each 
%           value. By doing this you can tell which relative darkness 







if(~isempty(ii)), ist=max(ist,ii(end)); end 
if ist>1, rr0=max(1,Rate(ist)/Rate(ist-1)); else rr0=1; end 
iidx=ist:Len; 
i0=i0(iidx); j0=j0(iidx); mean_disk=mean_disk(iidx); 
Rate=Rate(iidx);  mean_ring=mean_ring(iidx); 
  
if(plt) 
    axes(‘position’,[xl,yl,xd,yd],’xlim’,[1,Mx],’ylim’,[1,My],... 
            ‘xtick’,[],’ytick’,[],’fontsize’,8); hold on; 
    pcolor(data); shading flat; hold on; 
    colormap(‘gray’); 
    plot([I1,I2,I2,I1,I1],[J1,J1,J2,J2,J1],’w--’,’linewidth’,1); 
    ji0=My*(i0–1)+j0; 
    H=plot(XX(ji0),YY(ji0),’ro’,’markersize’,9); 
    for k=1:length(i0) 
        
H=cat(1,H,text(i0(k),j0(k),1,int2str(k),’HorizontalAlignment’,... 
            ‘center’,’fontsize’,6,’color’,’r’)); 
    end 
    title(‘Step6: Rate>=0.2’); drawnow; 
end 
  
%--- Step7: Find Relative rate + difference of  Relative rate > 
Critrr(2.2) 
%           The take the relative darkness values with the largest jump 
%           between. This value is called Critical darknes number. 
There 
%           are two criteria that must bet met to call an object a 
MILCO. 
%           For high resolution data(>25 shades of grey) the relative  
%           darknes must be greater than or equal to the Critical 
%           darknes(CritRT) 




% if(Tmax>25)        % high resolution data 
%     Crt1=1.5; Crt2=1.25; 
% else               % low resolution data 




    if Rate>0.5 
        Obj=[i0(end),j0(end)]; rr=1; 
    end 
else 
    rr=cat(1,rr0,Rate(2:end)./abs(Rate(1:end-1))); 
    drr=cat(1,0,diff(rr)); 
 71 
    ii=find(rr+drr>=Critdrr); 
    ii=ii(1):length(i0); 
    if ~isempty(ii) 
        ii=ii(1):length(i0); 
        Obj=[i0(ii)’,j0(ii)’]; 
    end 
end 
  
if isempty(Obj), return; end 
  
V=[mean_disk,mean_ring,rr,drr]; 
assignin(‘base’, ‘ObjV’, V); 
if(plt) 
    disp([‘Tmax=‘,num2str(Tmax)]); 
    axes(‘position’,[xl+xdd,yl,xd,yd],’xlim’,[1,Mx],’ylim’,[1,My],... 
        ‘xtick’,[],’ytick’,[],’fontsize’,8); hold on; 
    pcolor(data); shading flat; hold on; 
    colormap(‘gray’); 
    plot([I1,I2,I2,I1,I1],[J1,J1,J2,J2,J1],’w--’,’linewidth’,1); 
    ji0=My*(i0–1)+j0; 
    H=plot(XX(ji0(ii)),YY(ji0(ii)),’ro’,’markersize’,9); 
    for k=1:length(ii) 
        
H=cat(1,H,text(i0(ii(k)),j0(ii(k)),1,int2str(ii(k)),’HorizontalAlignmen
t’,... 
            ‘center’,’fontsize’,6,’color’,’r’)); 
    end 
    title(‘Step7: rr+drr>2.2’);  drawnow; 
     
end 
  
if plt & ~isempty(Obj) 
    xx=R*cos((0:80)*pi/40); yy=R*sin((0:80)*pi/40); 
    for k=1:size(Obj,1) 
        plot(Obj(k,1)+xx,Obj(k,2)+yy,’w’); 
    end 
     drawnow; pause(1); 
  
end 
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B. TEXT FILE 
p2=0.5, Critdrr=2.2 
k=1  1.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.1545     0.0000 
    4.4309     3.2765 
k=7  7.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.2953     0.0000 
    1.1737    -0.1216 
    1.4259     0.2521 
    2.0681     0.6423 
k=8  8.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0615     0.0000 
    1.0460    -0.0154 
    1.1606     0.1145 
    2.9346     1.7740 
k=21  21.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0524     0.0000 
    1.4086     0.3562 
    1.2344    -0.1742 
    2.1581     0.9237 
k=34  34.bmp  Obj number=2 
    1.1565     0.0000 
    2.0954     0.9389 
    1.6618    -0.4336 
k=38  38.bmp  Obj number=1 
    2.1861     0.0000 
    3.5807     1.3946 
k=44  44.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.2062     0.0000 
    5.3953     4.1891 
k=45  45.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0048     0.0000 
    1.0987     0.0938 
    1.2229     0.1242 
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    4.7619     3.5390 
k=46  46.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.1022     0.0000 
    2.3152     1.2130 
k=51  51.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.6715     0.0000 
    3.6163     1.9448 
k=52  52.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0813     0.0000 
    1.9145     0.8332 
k=58  58.bmp  Obj number=2 
    1.1603     0.0000 
    1.7343     0.5740 
    1.3728    -0.3615 
k=60  60.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0552     0.0000 
    1.8502     0.7951 
k=66  66.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.1735     0.0000 
    1.7976     0.6241 
k=67  67.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0655     0.0000 
    1.9691     0.9036 
k=70  70.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.2219     0.0000 
    8.0425     6.8206 
k=71  71.bmp  Obj number=2 
    1.4562     0.0000 
    6.5333     5.0771 
    1.1022    -5.4311 
k=72  72.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0449     0.0000 
    4.2805     3.2356 
k=96  96.bmp  Obj number=2 
    1.1767     0.0000 
    1.7511     0.5744 
    2.0118     0.2607 
k=99  99.bmp  Obj number=1 
    1.0330     0.0000 
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